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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is a death penalty appeal which presents, inter alia, 
a question as to the method of dealing with a mixed motive 
Batson challenge. Robert Allen Gattis, a prisoner on 
Delaware's death row, appeals from the judgment of the 
District Court denying his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. Gattis v. Snyder, 46 F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Del. 1999). 
The District Court found all of his claims to be procedurally 
barred, meritless or noncognizable. However, it found the 
five claims which it addressed on the merits to meet the 
standards for a certificate of appealability. These claims 
are: (1) that trial delays denied Gattis the right to a speedy 
trial; (2) that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were 
violated by an improper peremptory challenge; (3) that trial 
counsel were ineffective; (4) that the sentencing court 
violated Gattis' constitutional rights by sentencing him 
under Delaware's revised death penalty even though the 
crime of which he was convicted occurred prior to the 
statute's enactment; and (5) that the Delaware Supreme 
Court denied him due process when it affirmed his 
conviction and death sentence on collateral review based on 
a different factual basis from that argued to the jury. 
Because Gattis has not asked this Court to expand the 
scope of the certificate of appealability to include any of the 
other claims he presented in his habeas corpus petition, 
our review is confined to those five claims. 
 
Gattis' contention that application of the amended death 
penalty statute to him violates the ex post facto clause 
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because he committed the crime eighteen months prior to 
the enactment of the amendment has already been rejected. 
See Hameen v. State of Delaware, 212 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1365 (2001). Hence we need 
not discuss it further. We will, however, address each of 
Gattis' other contentions, and, finding them without merit, 
will affirm. The question of particular significance is the 
manner of dealing with an attack on a peremptory 
challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986), where the prosecutor's motives related not only to 
the prospective jurors' race (or gender), but also to factors 
that were properly considered. We hold that the state 
courts' application of "dual motivation" analysis to Gattis' 
Batson challenge did not result in a decision that was 
"contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States." 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1). 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History  
 
In May 1990 a Delaware Grand Jury charged Gattis with 
first degree murder and related crimes arising out of the 
shooting of his girlfriend, Shirley Y. Slay. The Office of the 
Public Defender assigned Richard M. Baumeister and John 
H. McDonald to represent Gattis. Baumeister contacted 
Elizabeth Dewson, the Public Defender's Office's psycho- 
forensic evaluator, to interview Gattis and subsequently 
arranged further evaluation by Cono Galliani, Ph.D. The 
Superior Court initially set a trial date of November 1, 
1990, but granted a continuance so that Gattis could be 
evaluated by a neurologist. The new trial date, March 20, 
1991, was again postponed so that additional medical tests 
could be performed on Gattis. After the court set a new trial 
date of May 20, 1991, the state sought a postponement, to 
which Baumeister did not object because Gattis' 
psychological and neurological examinations would not be 
complete until July or August. At a hearing on May 29, 
1991, Gattis expressed concern at the delays but agreed to 
postpone trial until November 26, 1991 to give counsel 
more time to prepare the case. 
 
In the interim, on November 4, 1991, Governor Castle 
signed Senate Substitute 1 for Senate Bill 79, amending 
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Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, S 4209 relating to the imposition of 
the death penalty; the terms of the amendments would 
apply to all defendants tried or sentenced after its effective 
date. Pursuant to the amended statute, at the penalty 
phase the jury recommends whether to impose the death 
penalty based on its response to the two questions set forth 
in the margin.1 The court is not bound by the jury's 
recommendation. Rather, section 4209, as amended, 
requires the judge to impose a death sentence after 
considering the recommendation of the jury if the judge 
finds: 
 
       a. Beyond a reasonable doubt at least 1 statutory 
       aggravating circumstance; and 
 
       b. By a preponderance of the evidence, after weighing 
       all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which 
       bears upon the particular circumstances or details of 
       the commission of the offense and the character and 
       propensities of the offender, that the aggravating 
       circumstances found by the court to exist outweigh the 
       mitigation circumstances found by the court to exist. 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, S 4209(d)(1)a-b (1995). Pursuant to 
the version of S 4209 in existence before November 4, 1991, 
the death penalty could not be imposed unless the jury had 
unanimously recommended that sentence. 
 
In the wake of this enactment, and pursuant to Delaware 
Supreme Court Rule 41, the Delaware Superior Court 
certified questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The questions are: 
 
       1. Whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the 
       existence of at least 1 aggravating circumstance as enumerated in 
       subsection (e) of this section; and 
 
       2. Whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, after weighing all 
       relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bear upon the 
       particular circumstances or details of the commission of the 
offenses 
       and the character and propensities of the offender, the aggravating 
       circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances 
       found to exist. 
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, S 4209(c)(3)a.1-2 (1995). 
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concerning whether the amended statute violated the 
United States Constitution or the Delaware Constitution. 
Defendants awaiting trial for first degree murder whose 
alleged crimes occurred before the effective date of the new 
law were given an opportunity to participate in the 
certification process. Gattis participated. The Superior 
Court issued an Administrative Directive postponing all 
trials and penalty hearings in capital first degree murder 
cases while the Delaware Supreme Court considered the 
certified questions. In February 1992 the Delaware 
Supreme Court responded, finding that section 4209, as 
amended, did not violate either constitution. State v. Cohen, 
604 A.2d 846 (Del. 1992). 
 
Meanwhile, in January 1992, the Office of the Public 
Defender moved for leave to withdraw as counsel. The court 
granted the motion and appointed Howard F. Gillis to 
represent Gattis, but Gillis withdrew from the case due to 
a health problem. On March 5, 1992, the court appointed 
Jerome M. Capone to represent Gattis. Five days later, the 
court scheduled trial to commence on September 9, 1992. 
On March 30, 1992, the court appointed Joseph M. 
Bernstein as co-counsel. 
 
Trial finally commenced on September 1, 1992. On 
September 22, 1992, the jury found Gattis guilty of first 
degree murder, first degree burglary, possession of a deadly 
weapon by a person prohibited, and two counts of 
possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a 
felony. After the penalty hearing, the jury found 
unanimously that the state had proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt the existence of both of these statutory 
aggravating circumstances. Ten out of twelve jurors also 
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances. Based on his review of the jury's 
recommendation and additional argument from the parties, 
the trial judge determined that the state had established 
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of two statutory 
aggravating circumstances and that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 
Accordingly, on October 29, 1992, the Court ordered that 
Gattis be executed by lethal injection. 
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On direct appeal, Gattis asserted various claims of error 
relating to the admissibility of evidence, that the death 
penalty was not proportionate to the offense, and that the 
jury was not randomly selected. After remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on one issue, the Delaware Supreme 
Court affirmed. Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808 (Del.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Gattis v. Delaware, 513 U.S. 843 (1994). 
 
Gattis then moved for post-conviction relief, which was 
denied, and also filed an amended motion for post- 
conviction relief.2 The Superior Court found all of Gattis' 
claims to be procedurally defaulted and/or meritless. 
However, the court granted Gattis' motion for reargument 
with regard to his claim that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to investigate an accidental shooting defense before 
trial. Unpersuaded, the court later denied Gattis' motion for 
post-conviction relief. 
 
On appeal of his collateral challenge, Gattis argued, inter 
alia, that a forensic scientist, Stuart H. James, would have 
testified at trial that the prosecution's theory of the case 
was physically impossible. After argument, the Delaware 
Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Superior Court 
to determine whether the state's theory was physically 
impossible. The court also directed the Superior Court to 
consider whether the state improperly excluded a potential 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Gattis presented the following claims: (1) the state withheld evidence 
and counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue at trial or on 
appeal; (2) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, resulting in his 
being sentenced under the amended death penalty statute; (3) counsel 
was ineffective for failing to pursue this claim at trial and on direct 
appeal; (4) persons opposed to the death penalty were excluded for cause 
from the jury; (5) the state improperly used peremptory challenges to 
remove persons opposed to the death penalty; (6) the state made 
prejudicial remarks concerning inadmissible and inflammatory evidence 
during its opening statement; (7) irrelevant and prejudicial evidence was 
admitted; (8) the state made improper and prejudicial remarks during its 
closing statement; (9) counsel were ineffective for failing to perform an 
investigation to develop his account of the events until mid-way through 
the trial; (10) the death penalty statute violates the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments; and (11) sentencing him under the amended 
death penalty statute violated his rights to due process and equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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juror, Wilfred Moore, for gender-related reasons. The 
Superior Court found both claims meritless. After the 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, Gattis v. State , 697 A.2d 
1174 (Del. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Gattis v. Delaware, 
522 U.S. 1124 (1998), the Superior Court rescheduled 
Gattis' execution for January 9, 1998. 
 
On November 25, 1997, Gattis filed in the District Court 
for the District of Delaware a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in which he raised ten claims. The District Court 
granted Gattis' motions for a stay of execution, 
appointment of counsel and expansion of the record, but 
denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing. Importantly, 
after the respondent filed its answering brief, Gattis filed 
the affidavit of Thomas J. Saunders, a capital litigation 
attorney, in which he stated inter alia that Baumeister's 
failure to object to postponing Gattis' trial, even though he 
was on notice that Senate Bill 79 could affect Gattis' rights, 
and his failure to inform Gattis that the proposed changes 
to the death penalty statute could affect his rights after a 
certain date, compromised Gattis' right to counsel and 
prejudiced his defense. The District Court found all of 
Gattis' claims to be meritless, procedurally defaulted, or 
non-cognizable and denied his petition. Gattis v. Snyder, 46 
F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Del. 1999). Nevertheless, as noted 
above, the court issued a certificate of appealability with 
regard to the five claims which it denied on the merits. 
Gattis v. Snyder, No. 97-619 (D. Del. March 25, 1999). 
Gattis filed a motion for reargument, which the court 
denied. Gattis v. Snyder, No. 97-619 (D. Del. August 26, 
1999). This timely appeal followed. Because Gattis has not 
sought to expand the scope of the District Court's 
certificate of appealability, our review is limited to those five 
claims. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
Gattis' habeas corpus petition was filed after April 1996. 
As a result, the District Court's review of Gattis' claims was 
limited by AEDPA. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S  2254(d): 
 
       An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 
       a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
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       State court shall not be granted with respect to any 
       claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
       proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-- 
 
       (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
       involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
       established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
       Court of the United States. 
 
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Court held 
that "[u]nder the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court 
may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion 
opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a 
question of law or if the state court decides a case 
differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of 
materially indistinguishable facts." Id. at 412-13. A state 
court decision is an "unreasonable application" if the court 
identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Supreme 
Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the 
particular case or if the state court either unreasonably 
extends a legal principle from the Supreme Court's 
precedent to a new context where it should not apply or 
unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new 
context where it should apply. Id. at 407. This is an 
objective test. Id. at 410. A federal court may not grant a 
writ of habeas corpus merely because it concludes in its 
independent judgment that the relevant state court decision 
applied clearly established federal law erroneously or 
incorrectly. Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 281-282 (3d Cir. 
2001). "A contrary holding would amount to de novo review 
which we have held is proscribed by the AEDPA." Werts v. 
Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 197 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 
S. Ct. 1621 (2001). We review the District Court's 
application of section 2254(d) de novo. Banks v. Horn, 271 
F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
III. Trial Delay 
 
A. Introduction 
 
In his post-conviction motion Gattis argued that he was 
denied his rights to a speedy trial, due process, and equal 
protection as result of the delays preceding his trial, and 
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that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to pursue his 
right to a speedy trial. Gattis contends that as a result of 
the delay he was sentenced under the revised death penalty 
statute and was prejudiced because under the previous law 
he could not have received the death penalty if, as here, the 
jury was not unanimous in recommending the death 
penalty. In his brief to the Delaware Supreme Court Gattis 
presented the claim in a mere two pages, offering little 
argument, asserting without explanation that the 28 month 
period of delay is "presumptively prejudicial;" that "the 
delays occasioned by Gattis first counsels' continued 
requests for medical testing were unreasonable and highly 
prejudicial;" that counsels' "lack of diligence" caused "delay 
which may cost him his life;" and that the delay 
"occasioned by the malfeasance of Gattis' public defenders 
should not be attributed to Gattis in the court's speedy trial 
analysis." 
 
The Superior Court found the claim procedurally 
defaulted but addressed it on the merits because Gattis 
had received the death penalty. Applying the four factors 
set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) -- 
the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the 
defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 
defendant -- the court found the claim meritless. Most of 
the delay was occasioned by counsels' requests for 
continuances in order to obtain medical testing for Gattis. 
The court determined that those continuances could not be 
attributed to the state and that they should be subtracted 
from the delay for purposes of a speedy trial analysis. 
Further delay was caused by the temporary stay pending a 
determination of questions certified to the Delaware 
Supreme Court, a process in which Gattis participated 
along with eight other defendants. Thus, rather than 
asserting his right to a speedy trial, "he took affirmative 
steps guaranteed to prolong the pretrial waiting period." 
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 at *7 (Del. Super. 
December 28, 1995). Finally, the court rejected Gattis' 
prejudice argument. 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court made no reference to 
procedural default, addressing this claim exclusively on the 
merits. In doing so, the court essentially followed the 
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Superior Court's analysis, rejecting Gattis' assertions of 
prejudice for lack of substantiation. "Because Gattis fails to 
make and substantiate specific allegations of actual 
prejudice, and because we find no evidence of prejudice to 
Gattis resulting from the delay, we conclude that the 
Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Gattis' motion. . . ." Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d at 1180. 
 
In his habeas corpus petition, Gattis asserts that his 
right to "a speedy trial was violated when he was not tried 
for an inordinately long time after indictment, prejudicing 
his right to a fair trial. . . ." As in state court, in his opening 
brief in support of his petition Gattis complains that 
counsels' continued requests for worthless medical testing 
were unreasonable and prejudicial, resulting in an 
eighteen-month delay which should not be attributed to 
Gattis. In his reply brief, Gattis responded to the state's 
argument that the claim was defaulted by arguing that 
counsels' ineffectiveness is cause for the default. He 
complains that counsel failed to pursue his speedy trial 
claim, that counsel seemed unaware that an amendment to 
the death penalty statute was pending, and that state court 
decisions prevented adequate factual development of the 
issue, resulting in insufficient record for its proper 
resolution. 
 
Gattis also filed the Saunders affidavit, which notes, inter 
alia, that the amendment to the death penalty statute had 
been introduced in the Delaware Senate on March 26, 1991 
and that on March 31st the Wilmington News Journal had 
noted that the bill had been sent to the judiciary 
committee. Nevertheless, counsel evidently did not know of, 
or ignored, the possible change in the law; he neither 
mentioned it at the May hearing nor discussed its 
significance with Gattis. The affidavit opines that adequate 
assistance of counsel, especially in a death penalty case, 
requires counsel to be aware of any law that may affect his 
client's interests, especially the sorts of changes 
contemplated by the amendment in question here. 
Moreover, the affidavit represents that there was no need 
for a postponement beyond July or August. 
 
Because the Delaware Supreme Court had addressed the 
claim solely on the merits, the District Court did so as well, 
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rather than dismissing the claim as defaulted at the state's 
request. The court found the claim meritless because the 
Delaware Supreme Court's analysis of the claim was not 
contrary to clearly established federal law. Gattis v. Snyder, 
46 F. Supp. 2d at 372. Because the Superior Court 
expressly addressed the claim on the merits regardless of 
whether it was procedurally defaulted, and because the 
Delaware Supreme Court addressed the claim exclusively 
on the merits without any reference to procedural default, 
we agree with the District Court that the claim is not 
defaulted. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989). 
 
B. Proper Characterization of the Claim  
 
On reading Gattis' initial brief, we found it puzzling that 
Gattis cast this claim in terms of a violation of his right to 
a speedy trial rather than of his right to effective assistance 
of counsel pursuant to Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 
668 (1984). Accordingly, at oral argument we asked Gattis' 
able federal habeas attorney whether his first claim might 
not be better understood as an ineffectiveness claim, and 
ordered the parties to address in supplemental briefing 
whether such an ineffectiveness claim had been presented 
to the District Court; whether it had been exhausted in 
state court; whether it was procedurally defaulted; and 
whether it was within the scope of the certificate of 
appealability. In his supplemental brief Gattis argues that 
he did not exhaust the claim in state court, that the claim 
is not procedurally defaulted, and that it is implicitly 
included in the certificate of appealability; he does not 
address whether the claim was presented to the District 
Court. In contrast, the state argues that the claim is 
procedurally barred because it was not presented in state 
court and because no further state court review is available 
to Gattis. Moreover, Gattis did not present the claim to the 
District Court, so that the certificate of appealability should 
not be deemed to include it. 
 
As our outline of the procedural history of Gattis' speedy 
trial claim indicates, the claim he presented to the District 
Court is essentially the same as the claim he presented in 
state court. As a result, he exhausted state remedies with 
regard to that claim. Ipso facto, if Gattis' claim as presented 
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in the District Court should be construed as an 
ineffectiveness claim, the claim, so construed, is also 
exhausted. Conversely, if it was not exhausted, it was not 
presented in the District Court either; it makes no sense to 
construe his claim as an ineffectiveness claim in state court 
but not in federal court, and vice versa. 
 
The problem for Gattis is that even though there seems 
to be a potential ineffectiveness claim struggling to escape 
from the confines of his speedy trial claim, he never 
released it by presenting a coherent, properly articulated 
claim under Strickland in either state court or in his federal 
habeas corpus petition. As Gattis acknowledges in his 
supplemental brief, "[b]oth the legal theory and the facts 
underpinning the federal claim must have been presented 
to the state courts . . . and the same method of legal 
analysis must be available to the state court as will be 
employed in the federal court." Evans v. Court of Common 
Pleas, 959 F.2d 1227, 1231 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. petition 
dismissed, 506 U.S. 1089 (1993). Based on Gattis' 
submissions in state court, described above, we are 
constrained to agree with his admission that he"did not 
. . . serve fair notice [on the state courts] that he was 
asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim within 
his speedy trial claim." But neither did he present such a 
claim to the District Court. It is not sufficient, as Gattis 
implies, that the District Court had the benefit of Saunders' 
affidavit. Gattis did not present an appropriate 
ineffectiveness claim except as "cause" for the procedural 
default asserted by the state and did not, along with 
Saunders' affidavit, file a motion to amend his petition to 
include one. We cannot retroactively amend Gattis' petition 
on his behalf. 
 
But even if the claim had been exhausted and presented 
to the District Court we would likely find it without merit. 
As we have stated, "there is no general duty on the part of 
defense counsel to anticipate changes in the law," Gov't of 
the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989), 
while the reasons given by the Superior Court for not 
finding prejudice under Barker would also apply to an 
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ineffectiveness claim. State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 at *8 
(Del. Super. 1995).3 
 
C. The Merits 
 
We agree with the District Court that the state court 
decisions are not contrary to clearly established federal law. 
Nor do they involve an unreasonable application of clearly 
established federal law. Aside from the reasons provided by 
those courts, we note that Gattis' claim suffers from a 
perhaps more fundamental defect: the right to a speedy 
trial essentially protects defendants against delays caused 
by the government. If the delay is attributable exclusively to 
the defendant, "he will be deemed to have waived his 
speedy trial rights entirely." United States v. Manning, 56 
F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1995). Similarly, portions of the 
delay which are attributable to the defendant or his counsel 
"will not be considered for purposes of determining whether 
the defendant's right to a speedy trial has been infringed." 
Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied sub nom., 505 U.S. 1223 (1992); United States v. 
Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1085 (1999). Because the only delays of which Gattis 
complains were caused by his own counsel, there is no 
merit to his speedy trial claim. 
 
IV. The Batson Issue 
 
During jury selection the prosecutor exercised a 
peremptory challenge against an elderly African-American 
male, Wilfred Moore. According to Gattis, this was done 
merely because Moore was a man, in violation of J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that 
peremptory challenges may not be exercised solely on the 
basis of gender). But that is misleading. Rather, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note that in his filings in this Court Gattis seems to argue that 
the 
claim was presented as a speedy trial claim because the state courts 
would not allow him an opportunity to develop a factual basis for the 
claim. We do not find this argument persuasive because Gattis blamed 
counsel for the delay from the outset. It thus appears that what Gattis 
lacked was less a detailed factual record than the appropriate legal 
analysis. 
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following exchange took place between Moore and the 
prosecutor: 
 
       Q: If the facts and circumstances so warranted, could 
       you recommend a sentence of death? 
 
       A: I don't know, sir. 
 
       Q: . . . . If the facts and circumstances so warrant, 
       could you recommend a sentence of life 
       imprisonment? 
 
       A: Yes, sir, I could. 
 
       Q: . . . . Now, you did indicate that you would follow 
       the Court's instructions on the law whether you 
       agreed with that law or not. . . . Taking those 
       instructions in mind, then, and taking into 
       account all the facts and circumstances, now, if 
       the facts and circumstances so warrant and if the 
       Court's instructions so permit, could you 
       recommend a sentence of death? 
 
       A: It's like going to war. I don't know if I-- you know, 
       until the time comes, truly in my heart would know 
       if I could bring a bullet up there. I don't know until 
       the time comes. 
 
       Q: Okay. Philosophically, generally, you're not 
       opposed to the death penalty? 
 
       A: I believe in the death penalty, but I don't know if 
       I could be the one to say, yes, sentence this 
       defendant to death until the time comes. 
 
The state then asked the court to strike Moore for cause. 
The court found that Moore's responses did not meet the 
standard in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) and 
declined to exclude him for cause. Accordingly, the state 
exercised a peremptory challenge against Moore. After 
Moore was excused, the state sought the court's permission 
to make a record of its reasons for the strike, which were 
as follows: 
 
       Number one, I believe that this juror was very, very 
       conservative in his application of the possible 
       application of the death penalty [sic]. He answered very 
 
                                14 
  
       quickly yes to the possibility of imposing a life sentence 
       under the appropriate facts and circumstances, yet, to 
       our belief, had a very difficult time in answering 
       whether or not he could impose the death penalty 
       under the appropriate circumstances. He seemed very, 
       very conservative in the application of the death 
       penalty. 
 
       Number two, he is an older gentleman and we have, I 
       believe, four or five older gentlemen on the jury panel 
       already. And I would suggest that it's the state's point 
       of view that we would prefer to have some more women 
       on the jury. 
 
Gattis brought this claim during post-conviction 
proceedings. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court 
remanded the matter to the Superior Court to make factual 
findings and conclusions of law regarding this issue.4 On 
remand, the state argued that even though one of the 
prosecutor's reasons for the challenge was based on gender, 
the paramount reason was Moore's reluctance to impose 
the death penalty. The Superior Court noted that the 
Supreme Court has held in other areas of equal protection 
jurisprudence that an action motivated in part by an 
impermissible reason will withstand challenge if the same 
action would have been taken in the absence of the 
impermissible motivation.5 Relying on United States v. 
Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 
U.S. 1151 (1997); Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271 (11th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1044 (1996); and United States 
v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 
U.S. 1149 (1996), the court applied the following"dual 
motivation" test: after the defendant makes a prima facie 
showing of discrimination, the state may raise the 
affirmative defense that the strike would have been 
exercised on the basis of the gender-neutral reasons and in 
the absence of the discriminatory motive. If the state makes 
such a showing, the peremptory challenge survives 
constitutional scrutiny. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It also remanded for similar proceedings concerning the state's theory 
of the murder. See infra at 20-21. 
 
5. The court cited Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 
274 (1977). 
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The Superior Court discerned no intent to discriminate 
against men. At the time Moore was struck, four men and 
three women had been selected for the jury. The state had 
used four of its challenges to remove two men and two 
women, and after Moore was removed the state used two 
strikes to remove men and three to remove women. In its 
final form the jury consisted of six women and six men, 
with three women and one man as alternates. Moreover, 
the state's explanation for excluding Moore focused on his 
attitudes towards the death penalty. The Superior Court 
concluded: 
 
       There is nothing in the record which indicates that the 
       prosecution was driven by invidious gender-based 
       stereotypes. . . . Based on the totality of the 
       circumstances, the Court finds that the State has 
       carried its burden of showing that the prosecutor 
       would have challenged Moore even in the absence of 
       any gender-related reason. In regard to the 
       prosecutor's gender-based motivation, the Court is 
       satisfied that this consideration was de minimis. The 
       prosecutor stated that several men had already been 
       selected and that he wanted to select a few more 
       women. On its face, this statement indicates that the 
       prosecutor was trying to seat a jury with a diverse and 
       representative character. . . . In light of the fact that 
       four men had already been selected for Gattis' jury 
       when Moore was challenged, it is not plausible that the 
       prosecutor's stated desire for a mix of men and women 
       was a pretext for a desire to exclude men because of 
       invidious, archaic and overbroad stereotypes. 
 
State v. Gattis, 1996 WL 769328 *6 (Del. Super.). 
Accordingly, the Superior Court found the claim meritless. 
Echoing the Superior Court's reasoning, the Delaware 
Supreme Court found "no abuse of discretion in the 
Superior Court's determination." Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 
at 1184. 
 
The District Court found that Gattis had not presented 
clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption 
of correctness afforded state courts' factual findings by 28 
U.S.C. S 2254(e)(1) and that the Delaware Supreme Court's 
rejection of Gattis' claim was "not contrary to clearly 
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established federal law, and did not rely on an 
unreasonable application of the facts." Gattis v. Snyder, 46 
F. Supp. 2d at 379. The court concluded that the claim 
fails pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). 
 
The Supreme Court has not addressed a case involving 
mixed motives in jury selection. Accordingly, we apply the 
"unreasonable application" prong of S 2254(d)(1) rather than 
the "contrary to" prong. Jermyn v. Horn , 266 F.3d 257 (3d 
Cir. 2001). As noted above, a state court decision is an 
"unreasonable application" of federal law if the court 
identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Supreme 
Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the 
particular case or if the state court either unreasonably 
extends a legal principle from the Supreme Court's 
precedent to a new context where it should not apply or 
unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new 
context where it should apply. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
at 407. In addressing Gattis' claim, the Superior Court 
correctly identified the main Supreme Court decisions -- 
Batson, J.E.B., and Mt. Healthy-- and, citing Wallace and 
Tokars, applied mixed motive analysis. 
 
In Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1993), the 
court addressed for the first time an attack on a 
peremptory challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986), where the prosecutor's motives were 
"mixed," i.e., involved not only the prospective juror's race 
but also other factors that were properly considered. 
Because the reasoning in Batson fell "squarely within the 
[Supreme Court's] tradition of equal protection 
jurisprudence," id. at 26, the court began its analysis by 
noting that: 
 
       In the realm of constitutional law, whenever challenged 
       action would be unlawful if improperly motivated, the 
       Supreme Court has made it clear that the challenged 
       action is invalid if motivated in part by an 
       impermissible reason but that the alleged offender is 
       entitled to the defense that it would have taken the 
       same action in the absence of the improper motive. See 
       Mt. Healthy City School Board of Education v. Doyle , 
       429 U.S. 274, 284-87, 97 S.Ct. 568, 574-76, 50 
       L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. 
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       Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
       270 n. 21, 97 S.Ct. 555, 566 n. 21, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 
       (1977).  
 
Id. at 26. The court concluded: 
 
       Batson challenges may be brought by defendants who 
       can show that racial discrimination was a substantial 
       part of the motivation for a prosecutor's peremptory 
       challenges, leaving to the prosecutor the affirmative 
       defense of showing that the same challenges would 
       have been exercised for race-neutral reasons in the 
       absence of such partially improper motivation. In 
       concluding that dual motivation analysis applies to a 
       Batson challenge, we do no more than apply that 
       analysis precisely as previously enunciated by the 
       Supreme Court in prior dual motivation cases such as 
       Arlington Heights. . . . [O]nce the prosecutor's partially 
       improper motivation had been established, Howard was 
       entitled to prevail unless, under dual motivation 
       analysis, the prosecutor could sustain his burden of 
       showing that he would have exercised his challenges 
       solely for race-neutral reasons. 
 
Id. at 30. 
 
Other courts have followed suit, applying mixed motive 
analysis to situations where not only race, but also gender 
was a reason for excluding a potential juror. See, e.g., 
Tokars (gender); Wallace (race); Darden (youth, 
inexperience, and alleged young black female tendency "to 
testify on behalf and be more sympathetic toward 
individuals who are involved in narcotics"); Jones v. Plaster, 
57 F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th Cir. 1995) (race -- applying dual 
motivation but remanding to District Court for clarification 
of findings regarding whether the strike was exercised for a 
discriminatory purpose and whether it would have been 
exercised in the absence of the discriminatory purpose). We 
find the reasoning of these cases persuasive. 
 
Because we agree with Howard and the other cases cited 
that mixed motive analysis is appropriate in this context, 
we cannot conclude that the Superior Court unreasonably 
extended a legal principle from the Supreme Court's 
precedent. On the facts, the Superior Court's discussion, 
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quoted supra at 16, rings true. We thus reject Gattis' 
contention that the record "clearly and convincingly" rebuts 
the Superior Court's factual conclusions, and hence we do 
not agree that the Superior Court (and, ipso facto, the 
Delaware Supreme Court) failed the "unreasonable 
application" prong of section 2254(d). Accordingly, there is 
no merit to this claim. 
 
V. Counsel's Failure to Investigate 
 
Gattis complains that counsel failed to develop his 
version of the facts, to investigate the relevant facts, or to 
interview relevant witnesses. He argues that if counsel had 
investigated the crime scene properly they could have 
shown at trial that the state's account of the crime was 
implausible. The government argued to the jury that Gattis 
returned to Slay's apartment in a fit of jealous rage, kicked 
in the door, walked up to her and shot her between the 
eyes, "execution-style." However, the fact that the victim's 
feet prevented the door from opening more than twelve 
inches means that he could not have walked up to her and 
shot her. Rather, it supports Gattis' contention that the 
gun went off accidentally as he was kicking in the door. 
Even though counsel could have learned of this before trial, 
they did not realize that Gattis' story was plausible until, 
several days into the trial, they entered Slay's apartment for 
the first time (they had visited the building before trial but 
had not entered the apartment). Gattis places much 
reliance on James' testimony that Gattis' version of what 
happened was more plausible than the state's. He 
maintains that counsels' inadequate performance affected 
not only the guilt phase, but also sentencing: the nature of 
the killing was central to the State's efforts to persuade the 
jury and sentencing judge that death was the appropriate 
punishment. 
 
The Superior Court found that Gattis met neither prong 
of Strickland. The court denied Gattis' request for a hearing. 
It placed greater credence in counsels' affidavits than 
Gattis', and concluded that counsel took reasonable 
investigative measures in light of the information given 
them by Gattis. The court also concluded that even if 
counsels' performance was unreasonable, Gattis had not 
 
                                19 
  
shown prejudice, in part because "his version of the 
incident . . . [is] simply unworthy of belief.. . . It is 
inconceivable that even one juror would have accepted the 
accident defense in this case." State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 
790961 *19-20 (Del. Super.). 
 
On appeal, Gattis argued that James would testify, if 
given the opportunity, that the prosecution's case was 
unsupportable. The Delaware Supreme Court remanded the 
case to the Superior Court to hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether James really would so testify. Despite 
concluding that the threshold standard for holding a 
hearing was not met, the Superior Court held a hearing to 
allow the parties to present evidence in support of their 
respective positions. After a detailed analysis of that 
evidence, the Superior Court concluded that there was no 
prejudice to Gattis. James would have testified that Gattis' 
story was more plausible than the state's, but would also 
have stated that he could not determine certain crucial 
facts, could not confirm Gattis' version of the murder, and 
could not disprove the state's theory of the murder. 
 
       Furthermore, nothing in James's assertions could 
       dispel the impression of an angry, violent man who 
       intentionally set out to kill Shirley Slay by shooting her 
       in the face in an execution-style slaying. It is difficult 
       to conceive that James' testimony would have elevated 
       the accident defense to a plausible level. 
 
State v. Gattis, 1997 WL 127007 *6 (Del. Super.). After 
reviewing the evidence, the Delaware Supreme Court found 
that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in so 
concluding. Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d at 1184-86. 
 
The District Court found that Gattis had not offered any 
evidence that counsels' performance was "unreasonable or 
egregious, or caused prejudice." Gattis v. Snyder, 46 F. 
Supp. 2d at 380. Furthermore, the District Court found 
"that the Delaware Supreme Court did not unreasonably 
apply clearly established federal law, and did not base its 
decisions on an unreasonable application of the facts." Id. 
 
We agree. The state courts correctly identified the 
relevant Supreme Court precedent -- Strickland  -- and 
accurately described the two familiar tests which the 
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prisoner must pass to obtain relief, i.e., show that counsel's 
performance was objectively unreasonable and "that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Moreover, 
the state courts' application of Strickland to the facts before 
them was reasonable. Counsel presented Gattis' account of 
the facts at trial: not only did Gattis testify that he did not 
mean to pull the trigger when he fired the fatal shot, but 
one of the central questions -- how far the door to Slay's 
apartment was open -- was explored in the testimony of 
three witnesses, while a fourth explained the size and 
layout of the doorway area. As a result, counsel persuaded 
the court to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses 
and to instruct the jury that if they found the shooting to 
have been accidental, they must acquit Gattis of the 
murder charge. In closing argument counsel insisted that 
when the gun went off Gattis could not have been in the 
apartment but in the hallway attempting to enter. Thus, the 
only question is whether the testimony of James or a 
similar expert would be reasonably likely to have made the 
jury believe Gattis' explanation. We agree with the Superior 
Court that this seems unlikely. 
 
The state courts and District Court did not separately 
address the sentencing prong of Gattis' claim, doubtless 
because there was no need to: its success turns on the 
success of the claim that counsel did not adequately 
prepare for trial. The sentencing prong also faces additional 
problems of its own. Gattis argues at length in his reply 
brief that the state's contention, and the sentencing court's 
finding, that the murder was "execution-style" played an 
important role in determining his sentence. However, the 
record does not support this contention. The government 
relied on two statutory aggravating factors -- the murder 
occurred during the commission of a burglary, and Gattis 
had previously been convicted of a violent felony-- and 
offered evidence concerning these non-statutory aggravating 
circumstances: the details of the commission of the offense, 
including Gattis' relationship with Slay, Gattis' propensity 
towards violence and threats of violence, victim impact, 
Gattis' lack of respect for authority, and his conduct while 
on court supervision. In its sentencing opinion the court 
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referred to the crime as "in essence, an execution carried 
out because of the defendant's misplaced and ill-conceived 
notions of infidelity on the part of Shirley Y. Slay, and 
because Ms. Slay, tired of the abuse to which she had for 
years been subjected at the hands of the defendant, was 
attempting to start a new life with her daughter. . . ." State 
v. Gattis, 1992 WL 358030 *3 (Del. Super.) The court 
emphasized that the murder was cold-blooded, with"no 
pretense of moral or legal justifications," and that there was 
nothing to indicate that it was a crime of passion or an 
impulsive act caused by serious emotional disturbance. It 
"was the culmination of years of torment, mental torture 
and physical abuse at the hands of one who selfishly 
sought her domination and subjugation." Id.  
 
Thus, it seems clear that when the court referred to the 
murder as an execution, this was a summary of all the 
other factors mentioned, including the reasons for the 
murder. That it was "execution-style" was not mentioned by 
the court at all, either in its description of the aggravating 
factors or in its description of the balancing process. Id. at 
*13. Central to the court's balancing was the evidence that 
Gattis was "a manipulative, dominant, and violence-prone 
assaultive male who treated Shirley Y. Slay as a mere 
chattel, a piece of property to control as he saw fit." Id. at 
*14. In light of the court's reasoning, we conclude that 
providing an expert to argue that even if the murder was 
intentional it was not "execution-style" is not likely to have 
made any difference to the outcome at sentencing. 
 
VI. Denial of Due Process on Post-conviction Review 
 
As described above, on post-conviction review, Gattis 
argued to the Delaware Supreme Court with regard to his 
ineffectiveness claims that James would, if given the 
chance, testify that the prosecution's theory of the case was 
physically impossible. On remand, at the evidentiary 
hearing the government presented video and testimony to 
show that even if the apartment door had been open only 
twelve inches it would have been possible for Gattis to 
reach around the door and shoot her. As noted above, the 
state courts found Gattis' ineffectiveness claim meritless. 
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Based on these facts, in his habeas corpus petition Gattis 
claims that his due process rights "were violated when his 
conviction and death sentence were affirmed on state 
postconviction review on a theory not originally presented 
to the jury or the court that tried and sentenced him." 
According to Gattis, at trial the state argued that Gattis 
entered Slay's apartment and shot her face-to-face, not that 
he reached around the door and shot her. He relies on 
Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979) ("To 
uphold a conviction on a charge that was neither alleged in 
an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial offends the 
most basic notions of due process"). As far as we can 
determine, this claim has not been presented to the state 
courts and, thus, is unexhausted.6 However, because we 
agree with the District Court that the claim is meritless, 
and because the District Court could have dismissed the 
claim as meritless regardless of whether it was exhausted 
pursuant to section 2254(b)(2), we shall not vacate the 
District Court's judgment and remand for further 
proceedings with regard to this claim. 
 
The District Court found the claim meritless because 
Gattis' conviction and sentence are supported by either a 
theory that he shot Slay face-to-face at close range or a 
theory that he reached around the door and shot her at 
close range. The District Court also found that the state 
courts did not sustain Gattis' conviction and sentence on 
post-conviction review on different facts or on a different 
theory than was presented to the jury. The Delaware 
Supreme Court stated that "the State never presented 
testimony from its witnesses nor offered any argument by 
prosecutors asserting that the door was fully open when 
the face-to-face confrontation took place," Gattis v. State, 
697 A.2d at 1185, a finding of fact presumed correct 
because Gattis has not provided clear and convincing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The District Court states that Gattis presented this argument to the 
Delaware Supreme Court as one of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 
evidently concluding that that would be sufficient for exhaustion 
purposes. Aside from the fact that it would not be sufficient (because it 
involves a completely different legal theory, Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 
364 (1995)), we do not see in the record where it was expressly 
presented to the Delaware Supreme Court. 
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evidence to the contrary as required by section 2254(e)(1). 
Moreover, both Dunn and the decision by the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals on which Gattis also relies, Cola v. 
Reardon, 787 F.2d 681 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 
(1986), involved a failure to charge the defendant in the 
indictment for the specific acts for which he was convicted, 
which is not the case here. 
 
The fundamental flaw in Gattis' argument is that in the 
decisions of which he complains the state courts did not 
"uphold [his] conviction on a charge that was neither 
alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial." 
Dunn, 442 U.S. at 106. The allegedly different theory of 
guilt was not presented on direct appeal in support of his 
conviction but in the course of a post-conviction hearing 
held in connection with his claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to present expert testimony concerning 
the implausibility of the state's account of the murder. The 
Superior Court and Delaware Supreme Court did not affirm 
his conviction based on the state's theory but merely found 
his ineffectiveness claim unpersuasive. The state's theory 
played a small role, if any, in the courts' reasoning. In this 
context Dunn and Cola are simply not applicable.7 
 
* * * * 
 
In conclusion, we find no merit in any of Gattis' claims. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Even if the decisions of which Gattis complains were on direct appeal, 
his claim would still be meritless. The indictment charged Gattis with 
one count of first degree murder, the killing of Shirley Slay. It did not 
charge him with killing her in a particular manner. Moreover, Gattis was 
not convicted of this murder on the basis of evidence that he murdered 
someone else or committed a different crime; his conviction was not 
affirmed on the basis of evidence that he murdered someone else; and 
the evidence used to support the government's different accounts (to the 
extent that they are different) of what happened is exactly the same in 
each case. Indeed, it is unclear that there was a different "theory" here 
in the sense at issue in Dunn and Cola ; the only variation concerns 
precisely how Gattis killed Slay: did he kick open the door, walk up to 
Slay and shoot her at close range between the eyes or kick open the door 
and shoot her at close range between the eyes at the door, perhaps by 
reaching around it? 
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Accordingly, the Order of the District Court denying the 
application for a writ of habeas corpus will be affirmed. 
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